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THE RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND DAMAGES
IN CIVIL CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS IN ILLINOIS
JOHN

T

H.

ANDREW*

of the courts of equity to enforce compliance with their
injunctive orders and decrees through contempt proceedings is an
important attribute of our system of justice. "For," the United States
Supreme Court has declared, ". . the power of courts to punish for
contempts is a necessary and integral part of the independence of the
judiciary, and is absolutely essential to the performance of the duties
imposed on them by law. Without it they are mere boards of arbitration
whose judgments and decrees would be only advisory." 1
HE POWER

For the private litigant injured by the violation of an injunction,
an important aspect of this power is the ability of the court to make him
whole. Should a recalcitrant defendant fail to abide by the terms of an
injunction which has been entered against him, what remedies are
available to the plaintiff? Can the plaintiff recover the damages he has
sustained because of the defendant's violation of the injunction? Can
he recover his attorneys' fees expended in calling the contempt to the attention of the court and securing enforcement of the injunction? Surprisingly, in Illinois the answers to these questions depend on whether
the original suit was brought in a state or federal court.
THE NATURE

OF CIVIL CONTEMPT

Contempts of court are usually classified as criminal or civil. In
the federal courts, the character and purpose of the punishment imposed often serves to distinguish the two classes.2 Where the purpose is
punitive, the contempt is classified as criminal.' Where it is remedial,
the contempt is classified as civil,' and the punishment is for the benefit
of the complainant.5 In Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,' the Supreme Court distinguished "between refusing to do an act commanded
* John H. Andrew graduated with a B.A. from University of Minnesota. He received
his J.D. from Northwestern University Law School in 1961.
1 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911).
2 Id. at 441.
8 Chefi v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 377-378 (1966).
4 Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368-370 (1966).
5 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911).

6 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
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-remedied by imprisonment until the party performs the required act;
and doing an act forbidden-punished by imprisonment for a definite
term." 7 The former case is civil contempt; the latter, criminal. A given
case may, of course, involve elements of both civil and criminal con8
tempt.
In Illinois, a distinction is also made between civil and criminal
contempts, the state supreme court having defined criminal contempts
"as those directed to preservation of the dignity and authority of the
court," 9 and civil contempts as "those prosecuted to enforce the rights
of private parties and to compel obedience to orders and decrees for
the benefit of opposing parties."'" However, the distinction is blurred
by the Illinois rule that, "The enforcement of a Court's decree by
civil contempt is not the enforcement of a private right but rather the
process of the Court to secure obedience to its decrees, the benefit to
the party invoking the aid of the Court being merely incidental." 11
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND DAMAGES
IN CIVIL CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS

The rule that in civil contempt proceedings the defendant may be
punished by the imposition of a fine payable to the complainant is universally followed in the federal courts.' 2 In Parker v. United States 3
the court explained the reasons for the rule:
Proceedings in civil contempt are between the original parties and
are instituted and tried as a part of the main cause. Though such proceedings are "nominally those of contempt," [citations] the real purpose of the court order is purely remedial-to coerce obedience to a
decree passed in complainant's favor, or to compensate complainant
for loss caused by respondent's disobedience of such a decree. If imprisonment is imposed in civil contempt proceedings, it cannot be for a

definite term. [Citations.] The respondent can only be imprisoned to
7 Id. at 443.
8 United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 298-299 (1947)

and cases cited
therein.
9 People v. Barasch, 21 IUl. 2d 407, 409, 173 N.E.2d 417, 418 (1961).
10 Id.
11 Eberle v. Greene, 71 III. App. 2d 85, 93, 217 N.E.2d 6, 10 (1966).
12 See, e.g., United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) ; Gompers v.
Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911) ; Norstrum v. Wahl, 41 F.2d 910 (7th Cir.
1930); Folk v. Wallace, 394 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1948); Sunbeam Corp. v. Golden Rule
Appliance Co., 252 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1958); Lance v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585 (5th Cir.
1965).
18 153 F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1946).

RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS' FEES

compel his obedience to a decree. If he complies, or shows that compliance is impossible, he must be released, for his confinement is not as
punishment for an offense of a public nature. If a compensatory fine is
imposed, the purpose again is remedial, to make reparation to a complainant injured by respondent's disobedience of a court decree. While
respondent may be confined to coerce payment of the compensatory fine,
he must be released if he pays the fine or shows his utter inability to do
so-confinement beyond that point would be punitive, not remedial. If
complainant makes a showing that respondent has disobeyed a decree
in complainant's favor and that damages have resulted to complainant
thereby, complainant is entitled as of right to an order in civil contempt
imposing a compensatory fine. [Citations.] The court has no discretion
to withhold the appropriate remedial order. In this respect the situation
is unlike that of criminal contempt where the court in its discretion may
withhold punishment for the past act of disobedience. An order imposing a compensatory fine in a civil contempt proceeding is thus somewhat analogous
to a tort judgment for damages caused by wrongful
14
conduct.
Often a monetarily important part of the damages sustained by the
complainant in a civil contempt proceeding is the cost of the proceeding
itself. In In re Federal Facilities Realty Trust,'5 the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit considered the court's authority to include an
award of attorneys' fees as part of the compensatory fine in such cases
and held that,
The rule to be spelled out from the court decisions is that a party compelled to resort to a civil contempt proceeding to preserve and enforce
an adjudicated right is entitled to a decree by way of a fine for
injuries actually sustained by him as a result of the contemptuous act
[citations], which may include, in the discretion of the court, an award
of reasonable attorneys' fees. [Citations.]6
Recently, the Supreme Court has recognized the inclusion of attorneys' fees as a part of the compensatory fine awarded in civil contempt proceedings to be an exception to the "American rule" denying
the award of attorneys' fees to successful litigants. 7
THE ILLINOIS RULE
Contrary to the federal practice, the Illinois courts have consistently refused to allow damages and attorneys' fees to complainants in
civil contempt proceedings. In Barnes & Co. v. Chicago Typographical

i5
16

Id. at 70.
227 F.2d 657 (7th Cir. 1955).
Id. at 658.

17

Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).

14
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Union,"8 a 1908 decision, the Illinois Supreme Court held that no statute authorized the imposition of a fine for the use of the complainant
in a contempt proceeding and that, in the absence of a statute, the court
had no power to impose a compensatory fine for contempt. 9 Following
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Gompers case,
the question of punishment in civil contempt cases was again brought
before the Illinois Supreme Court, in Rothschild & Co. v. Steger &
Sons Piano Mfg. Co.,20 and that court was strongly urged to follow the
rationale of the Gompers decision. The Illinois court declined to do so,
characterizing the Gompers decision as proceeding "on the theory that
a civil contempt proceeding for the violation of a prohibitory injunction
is a mere private remedy afforded to complainant, in which the dignity
of the court and the public is not concerned." 21 The court held:
The law is well settled in this state that the fine imposed in such cases
is so far regarded as a penalty that it is treated as other fines, and paid
over when collected,
not to the complainant in the equity proceeding,
22
but to the public.
The Illinois courts have continued to deny damages to civil contempt complainants. In Eberle v. Greene,' a 1966 decision, the defendant, having been found guilty of contempt, was ordered to pay to
the plaintiff the damages plaintiff had suffered as a result of the
contemptuous conduct. On appeal, the appellate court reversed, holding
that, "The established rule in Illinois is that the Court may imprison or
fine for contempt of its orders but is without authority to recompense
24
Plaintiff for his damages."
THE "ERIE" PROBLEM

The federal courts sitting in Illinois have, in conformity with the
general federal rule, awarded damages and attorneys' fees-including
fees incurred in the court of appeals-to civil contempt complainants
18 232 MI1.402, 83 N.E. 932 (1908).
19 Section 42 of the Illinois Chancery

Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1969, ch. 22, § 42), enacted
in 1872, provides that a court may enforce its decree "by fine or imprisonment, or both...
and by the exercise of such other powers as pertain to courts of chancery . . ." The act
does not restrict the imposition of a fine.
20 256 Ill. 196, 99 N.E. 920 (1912).
21 Id. at 204, 99 N.E. at 923.
22 Id. at 205, 99 N.E. at 923.
28 71 INI. App. 2d 85, 217 N.E.2d 6 (1966).
24 Id. at 93, 217 N.E.2d at 10.
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in appropriate cases.2" Indeed, the Civil Rules adopted by the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois specifically
provide that the affidavit upon which an order to show cause is based
shall set out the complainant's claim of damages, which may include
a reasonable attorney's fee, and that the order finding the contemner
guilty shall fix the fine to be imposed, including damages, and name the
person to whom the fine shall be paid.2" In view of the refusal of the
Illinois courts to award such damages and attorneys' fees, does the federal practice conflict with the doctrine of Erie v. Tompkins?2 ' Despite
the Rothschild court's characterization of the question of punishment
in civil contempt cases as "merely a matter of procedure,"" it can be
argued that it does conflict.
In Danville Building Corp. v. Gates,29 the court considered the
right of the plaintiff in an action brought under the Federal Interpleader Statute"0 to recover attorneys' fees. Prior to the Erie decision, the federal courts had, at their discretion, awarded attorneys' fees
in actions brought under the statute. The Illinois courts did not do so.
The court held that, following Erie, "a federal court may no longer
grant an equitable remedy in a diversity action where that relief is not
available in the courts of the state."'" Declaring the existence or nonexistence of a remedy to be a matter of substance rather than one of
procedure, the court denied plaintiff attorneys' fees. The Danville
Building decision has subsequently been adhered to in two opinions by
Chief Judge Campbell. 2 It may be argued that the non-existence of a
right to compensatory damages and attorneys' fees in a civil contempt
proceeding is likewise a substantive matter as to which the federal
courts should conform their practice to that of the courts of the state in
which they sit. 8
25

See, e.g., Crane v. Gas Screw Happy Pappy, 367 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1966).

26 N.D. Ill. (Civ.) R. 18.
27 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
28
29

256 Ill. at 207, 99 N.E. at 924.
66 F. Supp. 706 (E.D. 111. 1946).

80 28 U.S.C. § 1335.
31 66 F. Supp. at 709.
32 Illinois Bankers Life Assurance Co. v. Blood, 69 F. Supp. 705 (N.D. Ill. 1947);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 206 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. IM. 1962).
3 But, c/., Sunbeam Corp. v. Golden Rule Appliance Co., 252 F.2d 467, 470 (2d Cir.
1958), holding that a remedy provided by a state contempt statute is not applicable in a
diversity case in a federal court.
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CONCLUSION

In People v. Redlich 4 the Illinois Supreme Court declared,
In civil contempt proceedings the order entered serves two purposes.
In addition to vindicating the authority and dignity of3 5the court, it
also advances the relief granted to a party to the litigation.
It is submitted, however, that where a party is required to go to
considerable effort and expense to obtain relief to which he has already
been found entitled and is denied compensation for his damages and
expenses, his advance may well be offset by its loss. Moreover, the authority and dignity of the court may be far from vindicated in the eyes
of a party who has been forced to bear the expenses of litigation to obtain enforcement of the court's decree. This is especially true when the
fine imposed is minimal and may be regarded by the defendant as a fee
for a license to ignore the court's injunction. 6
Clearly the federal rule, permitting the complainant in a civil
contempt proceeding to recover his damages and attorneys' fees, is
more equitable than the Illinois rule. It is submitted that the time has
come to amend the Chancery Act to bring the state practice into conformity with that of the federal courts and thus provide the state courts
with an effective tool for vindicating their authority and dignity, while
at the same time truly advancing the relief to which the complainant
has been found entitled.
34

402 Ill. 270, 83 N.E.2d 736 (1949).

35 Id. at 277, 83 N.E.2d at 740-741.

36 In this regard it is interesting to note that while the court in Barnes & Co. v. Chi.
cago Typographical Union held that the fine imposed could not be paid to the complainant,
the dissenting opinion indicates that the majority approved the use of the amount of the
complainant's damage and expense as a measure of the fine to be imposed. 232 Ill. 402, 411412, 83 N.E. 932, 935-936 (1908).
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